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MANTEUFFEL, HASSO VON

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MANTEUFFEL, HASSO VON
(1897 - 1978) Commander of the 5th. Panzer Army which spearheaded the ill-fated Ardennes offensive of January 1945. After vainly requesting more help from a vacillating Hitler, he spoke despairingly of "a corporal's war". Later served as a delegate to the Bundestag (1953-7). Very fine military content T.L.S. "Manteuffel" 2pp. 4to., Diessen, Mar. 19, 1971, to Mr. Delligatti, in part: "...Concerning your question I follow Robert E. Merriam in 'Dark December, The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge'...they have better English than my hotch-potch!...Manteuffel...in conjunction with Model, made enthusiastic preparations only for a 'smaller solution', and although he made conscience-satisfying, but feeble, plans for crossing the Meuse river. He concentrated on the fighting east of the Meuse. Manteuffel, personification of the regular army field commander, believed that the forces were not sufficient for the ambitious objectives, but he was glad enough to tag along with the tide to hold his yob, and for the honor of old Germany. His personal cover-plan with the OKW was to say 'later objectives and direction of advance depend to a decisive degree on the measures of the enemy'...Hitler, know that Allied reinforcements of men and supplies were steadily flowing onto the continent, and, therefore, every deal lessened chances of success! Hitler's optimism and miscalculation, the, resulted in the belief that Germany had the material means to launch and maintain a great counter-offensive, a believe nurtured my many of his most trusted aides...The weakness of Hitler's plan were diagnosed by Rundstedt, Westphal, and Manteuffel as follows: sufficient force was not available to attain the distant goal of Antwerp; the German situation on the Western front was so precarious that it was questionable whether the divisions slated for the offensive could be kept out of the moil [sic] of battle prior to D-Day; the northern and southern flanks of the offensive would be dangerous open. The solution was to produce an operations order which would be less ambitious as to the terrain to be conquered and which would aim at maximum destruction of Allied forces with ,minimum risk. Model and Manteuffel, quite independently,....the two headquarters had arrived at the 'small solution' on the envelopment of the enemy east of the Meuse river. Shortla [sic]: my plan was to reach the Meuse river with bridge-heads on the west-side of the river, the further development/deployment of my division depends on the counter-measures of the enemy! After reaching the Meuse I wish to turn to north with my left (south) flank of my army on the east-side of this river -- in this case we were able to capture 20-25 American, British and Canadian divisions. I called this operation 'small slam' and Hitler's plan 'big slam', Model called 'small solution' and 'large solution' (I am bridge-player!). Merriam and Cole are absolutely correct and fair in their reports...". With numerous underlines made by Manteuffel throughout, very good condition.